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found altogether irrespective of all partisan affinities or preferences, either present or past. As one who has little to expect in
the future, but who has had a somewhat extended service in the
administration, as well as the study, of the jurisprudence of
the country, and who feels that the country has more to dread
from a timid or a time-serving judiciary, than from all other
sources, we may be permitted here to say, that these and other
similar indications which the times are bringing out, show very
clearly that the country is sound at the heart, and that the day
is not very remote when good men of all sections, and all parties, will unite in ascribing our salvation more to a pure, able,
uncorrupt, and fearless judiciary, than to all other causes and
forces combined. And if the time ever comes for the fall of this
free republic, its enemies will enter the citadel, through the
broken walls of the great bulwarks of liberty, caused by the
want of principle, or the dread of self-sacrifice, in her judges.
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iSupreme Court of Iowa.
PILMER VS. THE BRANCH OF THE STATE BANK AT DES MOINES.
1. Where a contract has been reduced to writing, the intention of the parties
must be collected from the instrument itself, regard being had to the subjectmatter and the situation of the parties.
2. Words employed in a contract in writing are to be understood in their plain,
ordinary, and popular sense, unless in respect to the subject-matter, by known
usages, they have acquired a peculiar sense distinct from the proper sense, and
then they will be construed according to such peculiar meaning.
3. Cotemporaneous conversations and agreements are inadmissible in an action
on a written contract, for the purpose of showing the meaning or intention of the
parties.
4. In an action on a written contract, it is competent to show by parol evidence
that words used therein had, at the time such contract was entered into, a local
meaning different from their usual signification, and that this was known to both
parties who contracted with reference to such meaning.
5. In an action on a draft payable in "currency," parol evidence is admissible
to show the peculiar meaning of the word "currency" at the time when and place
where the draft was drawn, and that the parties entered into the contract with
knowledge of such peculiar meaning.

APPEAL from Polk District Court.
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Action by the payee against the drawers of the following
instrument:
cc No. 2646.
Moines.

The Branch of the State Bank of Iowa, at Des

Des Moines, May 22d, 1861;
"cPay to the order of Philip Pilmer, in currency, one hundred
and thirty-six -o dollars.
" HoYT SHERMAN, Cashr."
"To Marine Bank, Chicago, Ill."
The petition alleged due demand, protest, and notice of nonpayment to the defendant. The answer admits the drawing of
the bill by the defendant, and sets up the following defence, viz.:
That on the 8th day of May, 1861, the plaintiff made with
defendant a special deposit of exchange on Chicago, payable in
currency, on presentation, that is, payable (as alleged) ,in the
currency of the banks of the state of Illinois, which were much
depreciated, and which were of the value, upon the average, of
seventy-five cents on the dollar; but this deposit was made with
the express agreement that the plaintiff should be entitled to
exchange on Chicago, which should draw currency of the same
character as that called for by the deposit made by him." ' That
the draft in suit was drawn in accordance with this contract;
that when presented the drawee tendered currency of the same
character as that called for by the draft which plaintiff had
deposited with defendant, and the holder refused to receive the
same; and that defendant has still on deposit with the drawee
said currency, subject to the presentation of the said draft."
Another defence, upon which, however, no question arises on
this appeal, was want of diligence in the presentation of the
draft in suit. Issue was taken upon these defences and the cause
tried by the court, who found for the defendant. The errors
assigned relate to the reception of certain evidence by the court,
the refusal to exclude certain evidence, and to certain special
findings, and the final judgment of the court. Plaintiff appeals.
Phillips & Phillips, for the appellant.
Finch, Clark &. Rice, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DILLON, J.-[After ruling points 1, 2, and 3 as stated in the
syllabus, the opinion proceeds "-]
Vor. XIIL-22
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The draft in suit is payable -in currency." And on the
meaning and effect of these words arises the main contest between
the parties. By the plaintiff it is contended that the words have
a well-known legal signification, and that parol evidence to show
that they had a local meaning, or an acquired peculiar meaning,
or in short any meaning other than their general legal meaning,
is incompetent. On the other hand, it is insisted that these words
had acquired at the time the draft was issued a local meaning,
different from their usual signification; that this was known to
both parties, who contracted with reference to this in the making
and accepting of the draft, and that evidence 'iscompetent to
show what this peculiar meaning is.
Currency is defined by Wharton (Law Lex. 236), as ,bank
notes or other paper money issued by authority, and which are
continually passing as money." This view is substantially followe.d by the Supreme Court of Illinois, Galena Insurance Co.
vs. Kupfer, 28 Ill. 332, where the judge delivering the opinion,
says: ,Currency is bank bills or other paper money which passes
as a circulating medium in the business community as, and for,
the constitutional coin of the country." c The term, 'current
funds,' means current money, par funds, or money circulating
without any discount." See also Lacy vs. Holbrook, 4 Ala. 88.
These definitions are too restricted. Currency is the circulating medium ; and is generally used (and is, indeed, so defined
by Worcester, voce Currency) to indicate " the aggregate of coin,
bills, notes, &c., in circulation; as ,a metallic currency," ,a
mixed currency," and paper currency, &c. See ace. Chambers
vs. George, 5 Litt. 335 ; 3 Mon. (Ky.) 166 ; 2 J. J. Marsh. 463.
Aside from extrinsic circumstances or a peculiar and acquired
meaning, what then does a note or bill, payable in currency,
call for ? It calls for payment in anything which is current
as money. If gold and silver circulate as money, they are currency. If bank notes circulate as money, they are currency.
Thus currency may be composed of either coin or paper, or both.
What ,currency" means in a note or bill is not very clear without some reference to the circulating medium at the time, or
without knowing what meaning is attached to the word generally,
by those who use it, or rather without knowing what specific idea
the word is used to express.

On questions of mercantile con

struction, we have frequently to follow the direction of TINDAL,
C. J. (7 C. & P. 701), to the counsel in the case, who was about
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to cite an authority: "You had better lay aside your dictionary
and appeal to the knowledge of the jury; for, after all, the dictionary is not authority."
The meaning of words changes. It is curious to note how
many words wholly lose their original or etymological meaning,
and from usage and change of circumstances acquire sometimes
an opposite and often a different meaning. See for example, the
word "homestead," as illustrated by the case of Hfopkins vs.
Grimes, 14 Iowa 73. Take, for another example, the common
legal word, indorse, from the Latin in, upon, and dorsum, the
back. It used to be applied literally and strictly to a writing
upon the back of a paper. It is now well settled that a good
indorsement may be made on the face of a bill or note: Story on
Bills, § 204; 1 Stra. 18; 16 East 12. If a payee of a note
should write his name on the face of the instrument instead of
on its back, it would be correct legal language to say that
he indorsed it. In Rex vs. Brigg, 1 Strange, supra, the defendant was indicted for fraudulently erasing a payment indor8ed on
a note. The proof showed that the words razed out were written
upon the face of the note, but this was adjudged no variance, and
the defendant was- convicted. This use of the word indorse
would, to a Latinist, appear to be a solecism; but an English
judge or lawyer, who knows that usage fixes the meaning of
words, accepts the enlarged or altered meaning without demur.
Many words have so precise and specific a meaning, that no
extrinsic aid is needed. Thus, if a written contract should call
for "wheat," no court would or ought to allow the party to show
that wheat meant "barley."
But if there is a difference in the
mercantile meaning of the terms "cgood" and "fine," as applied
to barley, evidence showing this difference may be given: Butchison vs. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 523.
The word currency is, as we have seen, far from having a settled, fixed, and precise meaning. And, even if it had sueh a
meaning in general, it might acquire in certain localities, or
among certain classes, a different signification.
Suppose, in consequence of a depreciation in the issue of banks
generally, the word ",currency" is set apart by general popular
use, to indicate these issues, and to distinguish them from coin.
If under these circumstances, the parties make a contract, and
use the word currency in its local or popular sense, will the court
close its eyes to the situation of the parties, and enforce the con-
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tract in a different sense from that which was intended? Suppose
again, for illustration, the circulating medium is divided into
three well-known and well-defined classes: 1st, specie; 2d, bankable funds; and, 3d, currency: say specie is par, bankable funds
two or three per cent. discount, and currency twenty per cent.
discount. Suppose this is understood by every man in the community. If a person, under these circumstances, gives a note
payable in currency, is it right to say that the general meaning
of currency is coin or its equivalent ; and hence the maker must
pay in a manner different from what the parties actually and
really meant? To interpret contracts in this way is to incur the
reproach of Lord MANSFIELD, by "laying a snare to entrap
mankind:" Pugh vs. Duke of Leeds, Cowp. 720.
We believe upon examination, and contrary to our first impression, that where a note is payable in currency, no rule is violated
in receiving evidence of the general and customary meaning of
these words at the place where the draft is payable.
The case of Thompson vs. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71, is in point,
and strikingly illustrates the question under consideration, as well
as the one above disposed of, with respect to the testimony of
Hoyt Sherman. A note was made, and dated at Buffalo, New
York, for $2500, payable at a bank in that city in ,Canada
money." "The plaintiff's counsel offered to read the note in
evidence, to which the defendant's counsel objected, insisting that
being payable in Canada money, it was not negotiable; that
Canada money meant bills of the Canada banks. The plaintiff
thereupon offered to prove that at the time of making the note,
the makers thereof desired to have it drawn, payable in Canada
bank bills, but that he objected, and insisted that it should be
made payable in Canada money, which testimony was objected to
and rejected." The court, per CoWEN, J., sa9: "That besides
being irrelevant, it was inadmissible, because it was direct, independent evidence of intention, as explained by the parties at the
very time of drawing the note. Everything of this kind, which
the parties declared, was merged by the written agreement. The
legal effect of a written agreement cannot be controlled by this
kind of evidence:" Creery vs. Holly, 14 Wend. 26; Hurd vs.
aallaher,14 Iowa 394. ,Nor, in general, can a patent ambiguity be obviated by it. I speak of the confessions and declarations of the parties, which go to show what they meant by the
words used in the writing. I do not deny that in such a case
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resort may be had to collateral circumstances :" Smith vs. Doe,
2 Bro. & Bing. 553 ; 1 Phil. Ev. 546; Pirsch vs. Dikson, 1
Mason 9, 11.
In the same case (Thompson vs. Sloan), the counsel for the
defendant " offered to prove the meaning of the words Canada
money, as generally understood at Buffalo by persons in trade
there, which evidence was objected to by the plaintiff's counsel,
but the objection was overruled, and the defendants thereupon
called several witnesses, who proved that Canadamoney was understood at Buffalo to mean bills of the Canada banks." In the
Supreme Court, Mr., afterwards President, Fillmore for the
plaintiff, insisted that the judge erred in receiving parol proof of
the meaning of the words Canada money; they are English
words, well understood and not requiring explanation. As well
might proof be received to show that the word land or the word
heir had a peculiar meaning in a particular locality. But the
evidence was adjudged rightly received. The Court says : " The
cases are quite numerous, that though the meaning of a word be
perfectly well settled in general language, yet if a secondary
meaning has been affixed to it in commercial usage, in a certain
region of country, or among certain classes of men, this may be
shown; and when the proof is clear, the use of the word in that
region, or among those men, carries into the contract the signification thus established."
A similar view was taken in the subsequent case of Roberts vs.
Short, 1 Texas 373. There, a note was given for " one hundred
and twenty-five dollars, in Texas money, at its current price in
New Orleans." It was holden that parol evidence was admissible to fix the meaning and intention of the parties, by showing
that the words "Texas money" meant Texas treasury notes. In
the course of a very able opinion, Ch. J. HEMPHILL makes the
following remarks, which are strikingly apposite to the case at
bar: -Words are always to be taken in the common sense in
which they are used. The very same words are often used in a
very different sense under different circumstances and at different
times and places. For instance, in a place where there are a
great many credit transactions, and no depreciated bank bills in
circulation, and there was much of such currency used in trade,
a promissory note, payable in bank bills, would mean such bills
as are equivalent to gold or silver. But let a change come and
a period of adversity and general depreciation succeed, and the
very same words would be used with a different meaning, and
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would certainly be referred to such bank bills as were in common
circulation, at their average depreciation. No one, at such a
time and under such circumstances, in reading such a note, could
believe the party intended promising to pay in bills equivalent
to specie."
1 Texas 381, 382.
The course of decision in Kentucky on this subject, remarkably exemplifies the correctness of these observations, and the
view taken by this court: Chambers vs. George, 5 Litt. 335 (A.
D. 1824) ; Lampton vs. Haggard, 3 Mon. 149 (1826) ; Id. 166 ;
2 J. J. Marsh. 463; and see also (Jackrell vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Mo.
688; and Farwell vs. Pay, 7 Mo. 595 and 597. This last case
was upon a note payable ",in currency." SCOTT, J., says: "Experience has taught us that there is a wide difference between the
currency contemplated by the law and the actual currency. The
parties must have had this in mind or they would not have deviated from the usual course, but would have simply made the bill
payable in dollars :" 7 Mo. 597. Same reasoning by CATON, 0.
J. : 27 Ill. 502.
The Illinois cases (Galena Ins. Co. vs. Kupfer, 28 Ill. 332;
C. -P.
& M. Ins. Co. vs. Keiron, 27 Id. 502, and the still more
recent and as yet unreported case of S. IVl. & P. Ins. Co. vs.
Tincher, 30 Ill., cited in March No., 1864, of Am. Law Reg. p.
312), hold a different doctrine. But their force is much weakened by the dissent of Ch. J. CATON (see 27 Ill. 502), who holds
parol evidence competent to show the meaning of the terms "ccurrency," and ,,Illinois currency." And Judge DRUMMOND, of
the Federal Court (Newell vs. Ins. Co.), admitted parol evidence
of this kind. The same may be said of Morris vs. Edwards, 1
Ohio 189. There was a divided court, and the case is opposed
in its reasoning to the New York, Kentucky, Texas, and Missouri cases before cited: 23 Wend. 71; 7 Mo. 595; 1 Texas
503; 5 Litt. 335; 3 Min. 149, 166; 2 J. J. Marsh. 463; and
see also the recent case of Bindsknff Bros. vs. Barrett, 14 Iowa
101.
It follows, from the foregoing, that we are of opinion that the
court did not err in allowing the witness Allen to testify what
".currency" meant in the general mercantile or business understanding at Chicago, for such was the substance and effect of his
testimony.
The view above taken is so well illustrated by the case of Goblet vs. Beechy, (3 Sim. 24; Wigram on Ex. Ev. 139, cited in
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Cow. and H.'s Notes to Phil. Ev., part 2, p. 533), that we cannot forbear to allude to it. Nollekens, the celebrated sculptor,
by his will, bequeathed all marble, tools, ",mod," &c., to the
plaintiffs. Parol evidence of an attesting witness was offered to
show that she read over the will to the testator, and when she
came to the word ,mod," she asked him what it meant, and he
replied, ",models."
The court held this testimony inadmissible, but allowed an
inquiry as to the meaning of the term itself from the testimony
of sculptors.
Such evidence does not infringe the rule, disallowing parol evidence to vary, control, or contradict a written contract : 1 Greenl.
Ev. § 292; Rindskoff Bros. vs. Barrett, 14 Iowa 101; Hopkins
vs. Grimes, Id. 73, and remarks of LowE, J., pp. 80, 81.
On this part of the case, then, we conclude that extrinsic parol
evidence of prior or contemporaneous conversations or contracts,
is nnt admissible to show what the parties meant by the word
"currency" in the draft in suit. But the evidence of bankers,
business men, and others, may be received to show what, in popular meaning or among business men, bankers, &c., the word - currency" meant at Chicago at the date of the draft, which is the
basis of the plaintiff's action.
To vary its ordinary and general meaning, the proof should be
clear and decisive, and to affect the plaintiff it must likewise be
shown that he was cognisant of this special or acquirid meaning,
so as to make it certain that he accepted the draft with reference
thereto.
For the errors above indicated in receiving portions of the evidence of Sherman, the judgment below will be reversed, and the
cause remanded for a new trial. Costs in court below to abide
event, in this court to be paid by the appellee.
Reversed.
Numerous financial crises, accompanied by violent fluctuations in the
value of our currency, have filled the
American reports with cases involving
instruments similar to the one above
considered. It maybe useful to collect
these cases, with a view to see how far
the courts have gone, either in taking
judicial notice, or in admitting extrinsic evidence, of the condition of the

currency at the time the instruments
in question were drawn, in order to
give to the contracts, if possible, a legal
and, at the same time, a not inequitable
interpretation.
I. Many of the adjudged cases have
arisen in states where the law merchant,
as to the negotiability of notes and
bills, has remained unchanged by statute, and the aim of the courts in inter-
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preting the instruments involved, has
been simply to determine whether or
not they were negotiable, to defeat or
to sustain actions brought upon them
by indorsees.
1. In the following cases the instruments in question were held not to be
negotiable-the terms in which they
were couched importing, in the view
of the court, not money, but depreciated paper of uncertain value: Leiber
vs. Goodrich (note payable "in Pennsylvania paper currency, or New York,
current in the state of Pennsylvania,
or the state of New York"), 5 Cow. 186;
Jones vs. Fales (" in foreign bills"), 4
Mass. 245; McCormick vs. Trotter
("in bank notes of the chartered banks
of Pennsylvania"), 10 S. & R. 94;
Lange vs. Kohne ("in paper medium"),
1 McCord 115; Fry vs. Rousseau ("in
current bank notes receivable at the
counter of said bank"), 3 McLean 106;
Hasbrook vs. Palmer (" in New York
funds or their equivalent"), 2 McLean
10; Irwin vs. Lowry ("in the office
notes of the Lumberman's Bank at
Warren"), 14 Peters 293; Kirkpatrick
vs. McCullough ("in current bank
notes"), 3 Humph. 171; Collins vs.
Lincoln ("in current bills"), 11 Vt.
268; Looney vs. Pinckston ("in current bank-notes"), 1 Overton (Tenn.)
384; Childress vs. Stewart ("in bankbills"), Peck's Rep. 278; Coldren vs.
Miller' ("in current bank paper"), 1
Blaekf. 296; Gamble vs. Hatton ("in
current bank notes"), Peck's Rep. 130:
Gray vs. Donahoe (" in current bank
notes"), 4 Watts 400 ; Smith vs. Philadelphia Bank (" in current funds"), 14
Penn. St. 525; Whiteman vs. Childress
("in current bank notes of Tennessee"), 6 Humph. 303.
A class of cases to the same effect is
found in the Kentucky Reports, arising
under a statute authorizing the holder
of a promissory note for the payment

of money only, to recover upon it in a
summary proceeding by "petition and
summons." In the following cases, it
was held, that ,petition and summons"
would not lie, on the ground, that the
instruments sued on did not import a
payment of money: Lampton vs. Haggard (note payable "in Kentucky currency"), 3 Monr. 149; MeChord vs.
Ford ("in current money of Kentucky"), Id. 166; Chambers vs. George
("in the currency of this state"), 5
Litt. 335; Louden vs. Kenney ("in
cash or cash notes"), 1 Bibb 330.
2. On the other hand, the instruments
in question in the following cases were
held to be negotiable under the law
merchant, or under statutes not essentially varying from it : Keith vs. Jones
(" in New York state bills or specie"),
9 Johns. 120; Judah vs. Harris ("in
bank notes current in the city of New
York"), 19 Johns. 144; Sanger vs.
Stimpson ("in foreign money"), 8
Mass. 260: Swetland vs. Creigh ("in
current Ohio bank-notes"), 15 Ohio
118: White vs. Richmond ("in current
funds of the state of Ohio"), 16 Ohio
5; Deberry vs. Darnell ("in North
Carolina bank notes"), 5 Yerg. 451;
Lacy vs. Holbrook ("in funds current
in the city of New York"), 4 Ala. 88;
Wharton vs. Morris ("in lawful current
money of Pennsylvania"), 1 Dall 124.
In all the foregoing cases, the courts
decided, upon view of the several instruments involved, taken in connection
with the known condition of the currency at the time, whether or not they
imported a promise to pay a definite
sum of money. In a large proportion
of them the courts commented, more or
less at large, upon the financial condition of the country, taking judicial
notice that the money of the time was
mainly bank paper current at par or
depreciated, as the case might be, and
thence inferring that the parties, by
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the terms used, meant either money
equivalent to coin or depreciated bankbills. See especially opinion of DuNcAi, J.,in McCormick vs. Trotter, 10
S. & R. 94.
3. In several cases, it has been expressly held, that courts will judicially
take notice of the value and condition
of the circulating medium in which the
business of the country is conducted,
for the purpose of interpreting contracts
made payable in it: Roberts vs. Short
(note payable "in Texas money, at its
current price at New Orleans"), 1
Texas 373; Dollard vs. Evans ("in
common currency of Arkansas"), 4
Pike 175; Neal vs. Durrett ("in notes
on the Bank of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky"), 7 J. J. Mar. 101; Leiber
vs. Goodrich, above cited; Farwell vs.
Kennett ("in currency"), 7 Mo. 595;
Lampton vs. Haggard ("in Kentucky
bank notes"), 3 Monr. 149 ; with which
compare 1 Greenl. Evid. 5, note 4.
But see Morris vs. Edwards, 1 Ham.
(Ohio) 80, in which it was held, that
courts will not judicially take notice of
facts of recent occurrence, relating to
the condition of the currency in a particular section of the state. See also
Feemster is. Ringo, 5 Monr. 336, in
which the same was held in relation to
a particular time.
In the cases thus far cited, evidence
was neither required nor offered. The
courts proceeded on the ground, that
the facts were so notorious, that proof
of them would be superfluous.
But where facts are of such a character that a court may, without violating any principle, if it please, take
judicial notice of them, may those facts
not be established by testimony, in case
the court is unable or unwilling to take
notice of them ? If so, the above cases
tend to establish that, in interpreting
contracts made payable in the ways
indicated, the courts may consider at

large the state of the currency at the
time they vere made, to determine
whether the parties intended to contract for coin or its equivalent, or for
depreciated funds.
II. Having ascertained what facts
the court will judicially take notice of,
it is next important to know precisely
what they will or will not allow to be
proved.
1. Evidence has been admitted or
held to be necessary in the following
cases:In Bogle vs. Vowles (bond payable
"in current money of Virginia"), 1
Call. 244, to show the circumstances
under which the contract was made,
with a view to relieve one of the
parties from the hardship that would
result from applying to the paper in
question the "scale" of value fixed for
it by statute; but the court held, that
the circumstances to be inquired into
must be "such as arose in the contract
sued on," showing "that the parties
contracted on the idea of no depreciation or one different from the legal
seale." So in McMinn vs. Owen (bonds
payable "in lawful money of Pennsylvania"), 2 Dallas 173, evidence was
admitted to prove, that it was agreed
that they should be paid in whatever
money was current at the time they
became due-a decision of questionable
propriety; in Thompson vs. Sloan
(note payable "in Canada money"), 23
Wend. 71, evidence was admitted to
show that those words, in general mercantile understanding at Buffalo and
in its vicinity, meant Canadian bank
bills and not specie, to determine
whether or not the note was negotiable;
so in Roberts vs. Short (note for ".one
hundred and twenty-five dollars, Texas
money at its current price at New
Orleans"), to explain the uncertainty
created by the words following the
word "dollars ;" so, "evidence was ad-
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mitted in Phelps vs. Riley (note payable "in current bank bills"), 3 Conn.
266, to show that at the time the note
was given, and through the whole of
the preceding year, such bank bills as
were described in the note were actually worth ten per cent. less than their
nominal value; and evidence to the
same effect, substantially, was admitted
or required in the large class of cases,
named below, in which the measure
of damages on such instruments was
fixed at the cash value of the depreciated paper, and not the face of the
note in specie or its equivalent.
2. Extrinsic evidence, on the other
hand, offered as stated in the following
cases, was rejected:In Lee vs. Biddis (contract to pay
"in current lawful money"), 1 Dallas
175, to show "what was the money
meant to be paid ;" but the court qualified their decision by the remark, that
perhaps the evidence offered would not
so much contradict the contract itself
as an Act. of Assembly, to the effect,
that current lawful money should mean
such as was current at the time of entering into the contract; in Bond vs.
Haas's Ex'rs. (mortgage for 2501. "current money of Pennsylvania"), 2 Dallas
133, to prove an agreement to pay in
specie-the court, however, basing its
decision upon an Act of Assembly similar to the one in the last case; in Cockrill vs. Kirkpatrick (note "in current
money of Missouri"), 9 Mo. 688, to
show, that it was understood by the
'parties to mean any other than gold
and silver, or notes of the Missouri
Bank; in Thompson vs. Sloan, ubi
supra, to show by contemporaneous
conversations that. a note, payable in
"Canada money," was, at the time it
was drawn, intended to be payable in
Canadian current coin; in Ehle vs.
Chittenango Bank (suit by a stockholder in a bank to recover, in specie,
a dividend declared by the directors,

but made payable in "New York state
currency"), 24 N. Y. Rep. 548, to show
the understanding of the witness, who
was the cashier, that the phrase "New
York state currency" meant country
bank notes current in New York city
at a discount of one-fourth of one per
cent., but not showing a general usage
in that sense; in Chicago Marine and
Fire Ins. Co. vs. Keiron (certificate of
deposit of "Illinois currency, payable
in like funds"), 27 111 .501, to show
that the terms "Illinois currency" had
a local signification, well understood
by all parties, and that they did not
mean gold or silver, or their equivalent. See also Marine Bank rs. Chandler (draft payable "in current Bk.
notes"), 27 Il1. 525 ; Marine Bank vs.
Rushmore (certificate of deposit of
"Illinois currency, payable in like
funds"), 28 Il. 463 ; and Marine and
Fire Ins. Co. vs. Tincher (draft for
"currency"), 30 Ill. 399, where the
same was implicitly held. In Galena
Ins. Co. vs. Kupfer (check for $40C,
"in current funds"), 28 Ill. 332, the
court went further, and held. that
where words have a well-defined signification, it is not competent to change
that meaning by extrinsic evidence of a
local usage affixing to them a different
sense. See also Edie vs. East India
Co., Burr. 1216 (1224), per Lord MANSFICLoD, and Chichester vs. Oxenden, 3

Taunt. 147, to the same effect. So, in
Hulbert vs. Carver (certificate of deposit of "Ills. Cy."), 40 Barb. 245,
evidence had been admitted, in the
court below, of a custom at Chicago,
where the certificate was issued, that.
where deposits were made in the manner specified in that contract, repayment should be made in notes of the
same character, that is, in notes of Illinois banks, but current in the ordinary transactions of business, in the
state of Illinois, at their nominal or par
value; and it was claimed in the ap-
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pellate court, that the bank had, therefore, the right still to pay in such notes,
although in the mean time they had become uncurrent and nearly worthless.
This the latter court denied, but held,
that if the plaintiff was not entitled to
specie, he was at least entitled to Illinois currency receivable in the ordinary
transactions of business at par. To the
same effect was Newells vs. Chicago
Marine and Fire Ins. Co., per DaumsMOND, J., infra. So, extrinsic evidence
was refused in Osgood vs. McConnell,
an unpublished case to appear in a
future volume of Illinois Reports, being
a suit on an instrument payable "in
current bank notes," to show, that by
such bills were meant depreciated bank
bills, and that they were not of the
value of coin. It was also refused in
Morris vs. Edwards, 1 Ham. (Ohio) 80
(note, payable "in current bank notes
of the city of Cincinnati"), to explain
a supposed ambiguity created by the
words cited; the court declaring, that
there was no ambiguity in the terms
of the note, which could be explained
by parol evidence.
To these cases may be added a class
that arose at an early day in several of
the older states, one or two of which
have been above given, in which the
depreciated paper of the Revolution
was the subject of litigation, and extrinsic evidence to show the condition
and value of that currency was freely
admitted, but under special statutes
for "scaling" debts contracted to be
paid in that sort of money; the act
requiring that judgment should only be
given for a certain amount, varying
according to the year the contract was
made or matured, and giving the court,
besides, equitable power to reduce it
still further where circumstances should
make it.
just: Lee vs. Biddis, 1 Dallas
175; Bond vs. Haas's Ex'rs. 2 Dallas
133; MeMinn vs. Owen, 2 iallas 173;
Watson vs. Alexander, 1 Wash. (Va.)
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440; Bogle vs. Vowles, 1 Call. 244;
Call vs. Ruffin, Id. 333. From these
cases the inference may be fairly drawn,
perhaps, thatin the absence of "scaling"
statutes, extrinsic evidence would not
have been admitted to reduce the
amount of the judgment, which could
only be rendered for specie.
III. Whatever the courts should hold
such contracts to import, it is evident,
that embarrassing questions might still
remain. What shall be the measure of
damages ? Shall the creditor exact the
face of his note or bill in specie; or,
so much specie only as will be equivalent to the market value of the bank
paper specified at the time his debt
matured? Has the doctrine of tender
in contracts for specific articles any
bearing on these cases?
1. We shall not stop to consider these
questions upon principle, but give the
results, as we gather them from adjudged cases. It was held, in the following cases, that the measure of damages was the amount mentioned in
the instrument, in specie, on the ground
that the contracts in question imported
a payment of a definite sum of money
or of paper current at par: Swift vs.
Whitney ("in currency"), 20 Ill. 144;
Moore vs. Morris ("in good current
money of this state"), 20 Ill. 255; Trowbridge vs. Seaman (" in currency"), 21
Ill. 101 ; Chicago Marine and Fire Ins.
Co. vs. Keiron (certificate of deposit of
"Illinois currency, payable in, like
funds)," 27 111. 501 ; Galena Ins. Co. vs.
Kupfer ("in current funds"), 28 Ill..
332; Marine and Fire Ins. Co. vs. Tincher ("currency"), 30 Ill. 399. See
also Courtois vs. Carpentier (" in sugar,
as money"), 1 Wash. C. C. 376.
The following cases sustain the same
doctrine, but under a peculiar state of
facts. The defendants, being banks or
bankers, collected securities sent to
them by Eastern customers, in Illinois
currency, then at a discount, though
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current between man and man, and
placed the proceeds to their credit.
When called on for payment, the defendants claimed a right to discharge
their indebtedness in the same kind
of funds, which in the mean time hud
beconie uncurrent and comparatively
worthless, on the ground that they
were acting merely as agents. Held,
that when they placed the collections
to the credit of their customers, instead
of remitting them, or of retaining them
as special deposits, the relation of
agents ceased, and that of debtors began: Marine Bank vs. Chandler ("in
current bank notes"), 27 Ill. 527; Marine Bank vs. Rushmore (certificate of
deposit of "Illinois currency, payable
in like funds"), 28 111. 463; Hulbert
vs. Carver (do. of "Ills. Cy."), 37 Barb.
62, s. c. 40 Barb. 245; and four unpublished cases decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States at its last
term, in which the Marine Bank of
Chicago was the defendant, and Eastern
banks plaintiffs.
In the cases mentioned below, the
same measure of damages was fixed,
but upon the ground, that, although the
contracts imported a payment of depreciated paper of a particular description,
by a tender of which, at its nominal
value, they might have been discharged
at the time they matured, yet, that, as
there was a failure to make such a tender, the debts became money debts, and
must be paid in full in cash: Hall vs.
-("to
be paid in one-shilling
orders at their value in May 1785"), 1
Root (Conn.) 493; Smith vs. Goddard
("in current bank notes"), 1 Ham.
(Ohio) 178; Morris vs. Edwards ("in
current bank notes of the city of Cincinnati"), 1 Id. 80; Edwards vs.
Morris (same case in Chancery), Id.
239; Duerson vs. Bellows ("in lawful
money, or good current paper"), 1
Blackf. 217; President, &c., Portland

Bank vs. Storer ("in Boston money"),
7 'Mass. 433.
2. In much the larger proportion of
all the cases, however, the measure of
damages has been held to be the actual
cash value of so much of the paper in
question as was equal in nominal value
to the face of the instrument sued on,
estimated at the time the latter matured, without regard to the doctrine
of tender, which, in one case, Moore vs.
Hudson River Railroad Co., 12 Barb.
156, it was held, did not apply to contracts payable in depreciated paper.
Of this class are the following: Phelps
vs. Riley, 3 Conn. 266; Robinson vs.
Noble's Adm'rs. (contract for subsistence stores, &c., "one half in specie
funds or their equivalent, and the other
half to be paid in Cincinnati in the
paper of the banks current there at the
period of the delivery of the stores ar
St. Louis,"-under the agreement there
being added the following memorandum:-"It is understood, that the payment to be made in Cincinnati is to be
the paper of the Miami Exporting Company or its equivalent"), 8 Peters 181;
Hixon vs. Hixon ("in Tennessee, Alabama, or Mississippi bank notes"), 7
Humph. 33; Gordon vs. Parker ("in
Brandon money"), 2 S. & M. 485;
Bonnell vs. Covington ("in the current
notes of either of the banks of Natchez,
or of the Union Bank"), 7 How. (Miss.)
322; Forean vs. Bowen ("in notes on
the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky"), 7 Mon. 409; January vs.
Henry ("to be paid in Philadelphia
funds"), 3 Mon. 8; Campbell vs. Weister ("the above sum will be received
in any good current bank paper"), 1
Litt. 30; Coldren vs. Miller (" current
bank paper"), 1 Blackf. 296: Hedges
vs. Gray ("in land-office money"), Id.
346; Osborne vs. Fulton ("in notes on
the Bank of Kentucky, or the branch
bank at Lawrenceburgh"), Id. 233;
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Wilson vs. Hickson ("in United States
Bank notes, or its branches"), Id. 23;
Wallace vs. Henry, ("in Arkansas State
Bank paper"), 5 Pike 105; Scott vs.
Hamblin ("in Citizens' Bank funds"),
3 S & M. 285; a. P. Walker vs. Meek,
12 S. & M 495; Roberts vs. Short
("Texas money," &c., as above), 1
Tex. 373; Farwell vs. Kennett ("in
currency"), 7 Mo. 595; Anderson vs.
Ewing (-'in such banknotes as arb
received on deposit at that time in the
Hopkinsville Branch Bank"), 3 Litt.
245; Gamble vs. Hatton (" in current
bank notes"), Peck's Rep. 130; Mitchell
vs. Waring ("current money of Pennsylvania"), 4 J. J. Mar. 233; Williams.
vs. Hall (,notes of the Bank of the
Commonwealth"), 2 Dana 97; Smith
vs. Dunlap ("in state of Illinois indebtedness"), 12 IlL 184, 399; Stevenson vs. Unkefer ("in Baltimore bank
notes"), 14 111. 103; Newells vs. Chicago
Marine and Fire Ins. Co. (certificate
of "Ills. cy. payable in like funds"),
per Judge DRuMxOND, cited in the
principal case (unpublished); Crutchfield vs. Tingley (, in notes of the banks
of Tennessee"), 5 Humph. 15; Hopson
vs. Fountain ("in current bank money
of the state of Mississippi"), 5 Humph.
140; Kennedy vs. Vanwinkle ("in
notes on the Bank of Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina, or Virginia; that
is, if neither of those banks should
fail"), 6 Mon. 398; Huston vs. Noble
("in notes on the banks of Petersburg,
Burlington, or Newport"), 4 J. J. Mar.
130; Scott vs. Conover ("current bank
notes of New Jersey and New York, of
each an equal proportion"), 1 Halst.
222; Deberry vs. Darnell ("in North
Carolina bank notes"), 5 Yerg. 451.
IV. The drift of the foregoing authorities is unmistakeable. It is towards
the position, that in suits upon contracts payable in specific varieties of
paper money, courts will look freely

into the condition of the currency, at
the time they were made, to determine
what the parties intended by the terms
used by them. Perhaps it might be
added, that they will do so without
very anxious regard for fixed legal
significations. This they can easily do
without any ostensible violation of principle, because it is always possible to
see or not to see, as did the courts in 1
Texas R. 373, and 1 Ham. (Ohio) 80,
an ambiguity in this kind of contracts
requiring extrinsic evidence to explain
it. It will have been noticed, that most
of the cases cited in this note arose
west of the Alleghanies, in states which
have been the favorite haunts of "wildcat" bankers. It is not easy to resist
the conviction, that known circumstances, threatening hardship or ruin
to multitudes, have in many of these
cases had their influence on the judges,
to induce a relaxation of strict legal
rules, with a view to the attainment of
what was considered substantial justice.
A disordered currency is no
man's crime. It is the misfortune of
whole communities, resulting from their
common folly and ignorance. Why
should debtors alone bear its burdens ?
Such is the reasoning that pervades the
reports, though, doubtless, like an undercurrent, to be detected rather by its
results, than by what appears on the
surface. But it is clear to us, that the
true interests of the country demand a
different rule, namely, that courts shall
recognise the facts of the situation, so
far as to hold a contract to pay as
above, discharged on proof of a tenddr
according to its terms, and no further.
It is not just that debtors should turn
a clause in notes or bills, designed for
their benefit, into a license to damage
and delay creditors. They agree to
pay so many dollars in bank bills of a
particular variety, which are at a discount. If they fail to do so, but keep

PILMER vs. BRANCH BANK AT DES MOINES.
such bills in their pockets, as they
must be presumed to do, let them not
complain, if they.are required to take
up their own paper in cash, and to look
to the banks issuing the bills they hold
for reimbursement. Starting with such
a rule, transactions would be soon conformed to it. The alternative leads to
gambling calculations, on the part of
debtors, which ought not to be encouraged.
But, conceding the weight of authority to lie with the most numerous cases,
the only mode, as we conceive, of making those cases consistent with wellsettled principles, is to regard the evidence, admitted in them, as tending to
establish a general custom, according
to which terms, in strict law importing
coin or its equivalent, had come to import depreciated paper. If that be so,
and if, in those cases, the custom conformed to the legal requisites of a good
custom, that is, if it was certain, uniform, reasonable, well-established, and
general, evidence of it would doubtless
be admissible; though, as we have said,
we feel confident, the true interests of
the country would have been better
subserved by holding, that where a
promise had been made to pay a dollar
-a term whose signification has been
fixed by numerous statutes, 1 U. S.
Statutes at Large, p. 248; 4 Id. p. 699;
5 Id. p. 136-the promissor must pay a
dollar, in value at least, as much where
he promised to pay in bank paper, and
failed to do so, as where he promised to
pay in wheat, and failed to do so. See
Wing vs. Erle, Cro. Eliz. 212, 267;
Smith vs. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728;
with which last, compare Hinton vs.

such evidence in this class of cases, upon

instruments that, in many of the states,
are negotiable?
The only case we have found, that
can be claimed as in point, in which
such evidence was admitted, is that of
Thompson vs. Sloan, cited in the principal case. But in that case it is observable, that the custom, of which
such evidence was admitted, was probably a general one. It was asserted
to exist "at Buffalo and in its vicinifl/,"

and it is within the knowledge of everybody living near the Canadian border,
from Maine to Michigan, that "Canada
money," in common parlance, means,
what it was there proved to mean,
Canadian bank bills. In the principal
case, however, the custom sought to be
established was claimed to be local to
Chicago. In no other case cited was
there admitted evidence of a custom
varying the ordinary signification of a
word at all, unless, as above intimated,
evidence as to the condition of the currency in the country generally, may
be taken to be evidence of -a general
See especially Roberts vs.
custom.
Short, 1 Texas 373.
The case of Goblet vs. Beechey,
3 Sim. 24, cited above, merely decided, that where a word had no meaning at all, known to the court, as the
word "mod." used in a sculptor's will,
the testimony of sculptors was admissible to show it to be an abbreviation
So, nobody
of the word ,models."
would doubt the admissibility of evidence to prove, that the letters "Ills.
Cy." meant Illinois currency: Iulbert
vs. Carver, 37 Barb. 62; s. c. 40 Barb.
245; Newells vs. Chicago Marine and
Fire Ins. Co., ubi supra. See also,
Locke, 5 Hill 437, per BRONSON, J.;
Dana vs. Fiedler, I E. D. Smith It. 463;
and Hoare vs. Graham, 3 Campb. 56.
But, of the admissibility of evidence s. c. 12 N. Y. R. 40,A But such cases
to prove a local custom, it seems to us evidently have no bearing whatever on
the question of admitting evidence to
there is greater doubt.
What is the authority for admitting show what the words, ,models," and
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currency," might or might

not mean. Having, by the testimony
of experts or otherwise found these to
be the words represented by those abbreviations, the courts must then interpret the words according to legal rules.
On the other hand, in Ehle vs.
Chittenango Bank, 24 N. Y. R. 548;
Chicago Marine and Fire Ins. Co. vs.
Keiron, 27 Il1. 501; Galena Ins. Co. vs.
Kupfer, 28 Ill. 332, evidence of a local
custom, whereby it was sought to affix
to words of a well-settled legal signification a different one, was held to be
incompetent. To the same effect was
the ruling of Lord MANSFIELD in Edie
vs, East India Co., Burr. 1216. See also
Clayton vs. Gregson, 31 W. C. L. R. (5
A. & El.) 300 (314-316); Smith vs.
Jeffries, 15 Al. & W. 561; 2 Phil. Ev.
788; McGregor vs. The Insurance Co.
of Pennsylvania, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 39.
We have thus ventured, though with
great diffidence, to express a doubt of
one ruling of the court in the principal
case. The difficulties of the question
are very great. No man lived in the
West in 1861, who did not know, that
for a time, the currency of Illinois was
greatly depreciated, and that, in fact,
when one spoke of "currency," he was
not understood to refer to coin or its
exact equivalent. And, as has been
well observed, the courts ought not to

affect not to know what is apparent to
all mankind. But while that is true,
it does not follow, that, when one promised, in 1861, to pay one hundred
dollars in Illinois currency, known to
be depreciated, he was not understood
to promise to pay in money that should
be current, that would pass for its face.
We all know, that such was the case;
that the contract was to pay what
should be taken as par funds; in other
words, to pay something that would
pass current, as money, and not as a
mere commodity. On the other hand,
does not the ruling of the court insert
into the contract a sliding scale of
values destructive of the certainty necessary to the character of commercial
paper-of paper, which, by the laws
of both Iowa and Illinois, is negotiable?
To the risk always taken by parties in
such cases, that the general scale of
prices of all commodities may rise or
fall while their contract is maturing,
does it not add a gambling risk, that
the currency involved will not fall below the average of all other articles of
value? For, if it does so fall, the creditor loses an indefinite amount, which
the debtor at the -same time gains.
Such a transaction is not business; it
is a selling of paper money, as the
brokers sell stocks, short, speculating
for a fall.
J. A. J.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
WARNER, APP., VS. WARNER'S ESTATE.
Where the testator made his will in 157, and wrote it mostly upon one side
of a half sheet of foolscap paper, the signature and attestation clause being
upon the other side of the same paper near the top, and two years afterwards
wrote below all the writing and near the middle of the sheet, "This will is
hereby cancelled and annulled in full this 15th day of March, 1859," it was held
to amount to a revocation of the will by "'cancelling," and it cannot be thereafter revived.by parol declarations of such a purpose or desire on the part of
the testator.
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This is an appeal from the Probate Court to the County Court,
and comes into this court upon exceptions taken on the trial in
the County Court.
The appellant propounded the will of her deceased husliand
for probate. The paper produced was his will, duly executed in
1857. It was written by the testator (in earlier life a practising
lawyer) on an ordinary sheet of foolscap, the main portion of the
will being on the first page, the closing clause and the attestation
and testator's signature of execution being on the second page,
near the top. On that second page, about the middle of it, and
just below said attestation and signature of execution, the testator, with his own hand, wrote, " This will is hereby cancelled and
annulled in full, this 15th day of March, 1859 ;" and it was
proved to have been written by him on that day. The testator
died in August, 1861, aged upwards of seventy years. Soon
after his death this paper was found by his wife in a small trunk
in which he was accustomed to keep his notes, deeds, and valuable papers, and some of his money: and which he kept locked,
he carrying the key. Evidence was given, on both sides, as to
sayings of the testator as to this will, and as to his purpose in
respect to the disposition of his property,-on the part of the proponent, that two days before the testator's death, he told his
wife that she would find in said trunk a will made out by him for
her benefit ; on the part of the contestants, that at the time he
wrote as above stated at the close of the will, and along, from
time to time, to near the time of his death, he expressed the
intent to cancel and revoke said will, and that he regarded and
treated it as cancelled and revoked.
The questions made, which call for consideration, were, 1st.
Upon the claim of the proponent, that such writing was not such
an act of cancelling as the law makes necessary for the revocation of a will, although the deceased might have done it with
intent to revoke said will; 2d. That what the testator said to his
wife two days before his death, should be held to be a republication of the will.
The verdict was, that said instrument was not the last will and
testament of said Warner, deceased.
The other half of the sheet on which the will was written, was
blank, except after being folded, there was a proper filing of the
will, underneath which was written,
"cCancelled and is void.
(Sig.)
J. WARNER."
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This was proved to have been written on said 15th of March,
1859, by the testator.
Roberts, for the appellant, cited to the point that the intent
must be accompanied with the statutory act in order to constitute
a revocation: Blanchard vs. Blanchard, 32 Yermt. 62; Leaycroft vs. Simmons, 3 Bradf. 44; Clinganvs. Mitcheltree, 31 Penn.
St. 25 ; Rise vs. Pincher, 10 Iredell 139; Kent vs. Mehaffey,
10 Ohio N. S. 204.
As to the meaning of cancel, Andrews', Worcester's, Webster's,
and Richardson's Dictionaries; 2 Blackst. Com. 309; Burrill's
Law Dict. ; Swinburne, pt. 7, § 16 ; Stephens vs. Tapsell, 2 Curteis 458; Roget's Thesaurus, §§ 552-756; Clark vs. 'Scripps,
2 E. L. & E. 627 ; Goods of Fury, 9 E. L. & E. 600 ; Goods of
Brewster, 6 Jur. N. S. 56.
As to the extent of the act: Reed vs. Harris,33 E. L. &E. 57;
Redfield on Wills, 313-14 and notes; Bobbs vs. Knight, 1 Curteis 768. Whether these writings constitute the act of cancelling, is a question of law to be determined by inspection : Hiisten
vs. King, 3 Levinz 86; Lewis vs. Lewis, 2 Watts & Serg. 455;
McPherson vs. Clark, 3 Bradf. 95; Martins vs. Gardner, 8
Simons 73 ; Clark vs. Smith, 34 Barb. 140 ; Grantly vs. Garthvaite, 2 Russ. Ch. Rep. 90; Hfeise vs. Heise, 3 Penn. St. 246;
Overall vs. Overall, Litt. Sel. Cas.; Bethell vs. Mfoore, 2 Dev. &
Bat. 316; Bibb vs. Thomas, 2 W. B1. 1043; 1 Wins. Ex'rs.
113; Jarman 116-17; 2 Am. Lead. Cases 688, 692.
Evidence of subsequent declarations not admissible: Dan vs.
Brown, 4 Cow. 483; Waterman vs. Whitney, 1 Kern. 157;
Stains vs. Stewart, 8 Jurist, N. S. 440; Doe vs. Palmer, 6 E.
L. & E. 155 ; Redf. on Wills 831 ; 2 Am. Leading Cases 688.
That the will was republished: 1 Wins. Ex'rs. 169, 171, 175,
179; 2 Lev. 86; 2 Addams 48; 2 Ilagg. 209; 2 Am. Lead.
Cases 725, et seq.; 2 Binney 406; 2 Whart. 103; 10 Harris
416; 8 Barr 498; 1 Grant's Cases 75; 40 Penn. 217; Redf.
on Wills 367.
Shaw and Phelps, for contestants, cited 33 E. L. & E. 57;
Avery vs. .Pixley, 4 Mass. 460; .3oorevs. Moore, Phillimore 109,
123; 1 Jarman 155; 2 Am. Lead. Cases 645; Bibb vs. Thomas,
2 W. Bl. 1043; Clark vs. Scripps, 2 E. L. & E. 630; 1 Wins.
Ex'rs. 110; Baptist Church vs. Robbarts, 2 Barr 110; Redf. on
Wills 367-70, 374.
VoL. XIII-23
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARRETT, J.-The main question in this case is whether the
will was revoked by the act of the testator in writing what he
did on the second page of the instrument.
The statute prescribes the several and only modes in which a
will, duly executed, may be revoked, viz. : 1st. By some will,
codicil, or other writing ; 2d. By burning, tearing, cancelling, or
obliterating. It is clear, and is conceded, that this will is not
revoked by either of the former modes, nor by either of the other
modes, unless it be by cancelling. That is a mode by itself, different and distinct from burning, tearing, or obliterating, though
obliteration may in some cases be an act of cancelling. In the
present case there is no obliteration. So the only question is,
was the act of the testator a cancelling within the meaning and
intent of the statute?
We regard it as a settled doctrine of the interpretation of statutes, that when an English statute is enacted in this state, if it
had received a judicial interpretation in England prior to its enactment here, it is to be taken that the language is used in our
statute in the sense given to it by the adjudications in England,
unless some other sense is impressed upon it by attendant provisions of the statute thus enacted. But if it had received no such
interpretation, it stands for interpretation here the same as if it
had been first enacted here. Adjudications in England, made
since such enactment here, have not the force of authority, as to
the sense of the language as used in our law. As resting on reasons that commend themselves to our approbation, all adjudications upon the subject may aid in giving to terms used a just
sense and effect, having reference to the subject-matter of, and
the purpose designed to be served by, the statute in question.
It is plain that the object of the statute 29 Car. II. is the
same as that for which our similar statute was enacted ; and, in
the matter of wills, to provide complete security against their
revocation being effectuated, unless by means insuring the utmost
certainty that it was the intent of the testator to revoke what
would otherwise stand for and be effectual as a will disposing of
his worldly effects. To this intent the provisions in this behalf
have been made. The class of acts of revocation, of which cancelling constitutes one mode, contemplates something to be done
to the instrument itself, showing, or tending to show, that, by
such act the testator designed to make an end of his will, and

WARNER, APP., vs. WARNER'S ESTATE.

each of the modes prescribed was designed to be equally effectual
in that respect. If the document should be entirely burned up,
or entirely obliterated, or torn into scraps, or covered over with
closely-drawn cross-lines, there would be no doubt as to the intent
of the testator. But it has been held not to be necessary to go
to that extent, in any of the modes, in order to answer the
requirements of the statute; and that the slightest degree of
either mode, provided it appear, even by resort to other evidence,
that the act was done with intent to have it constitute a revocation, is effectual as such revocation.
Accordingly it has been decided that the slightest burning or
tearing of the material on which the will was written, even though
none of the script should be destroyed or effaced,-that the erasure of a single word, or the drawing of a slight line across the
face of the script, partaking of the character of the act prescribed by the statute, if it appear to have been done in the
accomplishment of such act, effectuates a revocation.
Now it is obvious from the general current of the cases, early
and late, that the leading idea is, that the testator must perform
some one of the prescribed acts upon the instrument itself, so
that when produced, it shall bear the mark of such act. What
amounts to burning, to tearing, to obliterating, is not the subject
of question. But what amounts to cancelling-how, with reference to the text of the instrument, must the act be done, not as
to the shape or character of the marks, but where must they be
located, is the main point of debate in the present case. The
proponent claims that the cancelling marks must be upon some
part of the written text of the will.
The Latin verb from which the term cancel is derived, means,
to make lattice-work ; and the corresponding noun in Latin, in
the plural-cancelli-signifies lattice-work; and, when applied
to marks, means marks made in the form of lattice-work. How
this term came to be applied to marks made upon written instruments, for the purpose of destroying their validity, is obvious,
both from general and judicial history, not only as taught by the
books, but as derived from observation. To dtaw cross-lines over
the face of a written instrument has been and is a common mode
of showing the intent thereby to make an end of it as an instrument in force. In earlier times, when the ability to write was
possessed by very few, the great mass of persons of all grades,
from the highest lord to the lowest peasant, could manifest their
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intent -with pen and ink only by unlettered marks. While they
would be dependent on the few skilled in the art, to draw their
instruments of contract or making disposition of their property,
they could and did resort to various modes by which, without
clerkly aid, to make an end of their vitality. From the fact that
cross-marks were so easily made, and when made upon the face
of a written instrument, were so significant that thereby the
maker of them designed to put an end to the continuing validity
of the instrument, this mode was recognised and adopted into the
statute, in common with tearing, burning, an& obliterating, as one
by which wills might be revoked. In some instances this mode
might be preferable to either of the cihers, as when it should be
desirable to preserve the legibility if the entire instrument,which might not happen as the result of burning, tearing, or
obliterating. While, therefore, a common and customary mode
of manifesting the intent to abrogate the instrument by drawing
cross-lines over the face of it, gave rise to the use of the term
cancel, still the entire judicial history of the subject shows
that that manner of marking an instrument is by no means essential in order to answer to the full force and effect of the term, in
its legal sense. The net result of all the cases and all the text
books, as well as the reason of the thing, and the appropriate
analogies, seems to be this,-that when the instrument is so
marked by the maker of it, as to show clearly, whenever it is
produced, that the act was designed by him to be a cancelling,
that act becomes effectual, by force of the statute, as a revocation of the will by cancelling. In the present-case, the act of
the testator was done, not only upon the paper on which the will
was written, but upon such a part of it as always to go with that
part of the will which contains the disposition of the property,not indeed upon the face, but on the back of such disposition.
It is obvious that the act itself was designed to constitute a
revocation by cancelling. This is not a mere memorandum or
declaration, which, as such, produces a legal effect by force of the
t~rms, but it was the performing of an act upon the instrument
itself, which act produces the legal effect. If cross-lines had
been drawn over the face of the writing of the will, they would
have been effectual, because they would have constituted an act
done to the instrument showing the intent of the testator by that
act to destroy the validity of it. Instead of thus drawing lines,
he equally performed an act to the substance of the instrument,
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and as inseparable from the written* text, as cross-lines over its
face, showing with clearer certainty the intent, by that act, to
destroy its validity. Instead of leaving the significance of
informal marks to be fixed by the location they should occupy,
he formed the marks into letters and words expressive of their
signIficance, and as effectually placed them upon the instrument,
as if they had been made upon the face of the script of the will.
If he had drawn a slight line from the top to the bottom of the
writing, though it would not have been cancelli, within the etymological and primary meaning of the term, still it is conceded
that it would have been a cancelling of the will, if done with that
intent, within the legal meaning of the term. We think that
writing upon the will, as was done in this case, as nearly answers
to the primary sense of that term, as such mark would, and,
having regard to the ground on which effect is given to an act of
cancellation, such writing answers every reason and requisite of
the law.
The case of Lewis vs. Lewis, 2 W. & S. 455, comes nearer to
a position of conflict with the view we hold than any one to which
attention has been called; yet its chaiacterizing facts are so different from those of the case in hand, as, in our judgment, to
relieve the two cases from any such conflict. In that case the
word "obsolete" was written by the testator on the margin,
against a certain clause of the will. The court held that that
did not, of itself, constitute a cancelling. There was no evidence,
aside from what that word in that location imported, of the intention of the testator, as to the character and effect of writing it.
It was not a cancellation in the primary sense of the term, not
being a cross-marking on the face of the writing. It was not in
the wider sense accorded to it by the law, because it was not
upon the writing at all, as and for a mark drawn over it. The
word itself did not, in its position, indicate that the act of making
it was designed to be an act of cancelling. Itwas so placed upon
the paper that it might be separated and leave the written part
of the will entire and intact. It might have been designed as a
mere memorandum or declaration, to have effect as such, and not
as the effectual fact which operates in virtue of the act of thus
marking the instrument.
Several cases were cited in the argument in which there had
been erasures or interlineations or both, and it was held that the
wills were not thereby revoked, because it did not appear on the
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one hand, to have been the intention of the testator to have the
act constitute a cancelling, or, on the other, if so intended, that
the act was completed by the testator, having done all that he
designed to do as constituting such act of cancelling. Such are
Winsor et al. vs. Prattet al., 6 E. L. & H. 299; McPherson vs.
Clark, 3 Bradf. 95; Martins vs. Gardner, 8 Simons 73; Clark
vs. Smith, 34 Barb. 140.
The ground and reason of those and similar decisions are well
stated, and cases referred to in Redf. on Wills 315, also in 2
Am. Lead. Cases 692, where it is said: ,Although interlineations, intended to vary the sense of the will, and not to destroy
it, cannot, in themselves, amount to a cancellation ; there is no
room for doubt, that when taken in connection with actual
erasures, they may go to make up the proof of a change of disposing purpose, and show a total or partial revocation of the
instrument." And this is fully sustained by the authorities cited.
There is a class of cases of revocation by burning, tearing, or
obliterating, in which the principle and its application seem to us
to be precisely the same that we adopt and make in this case.
Primarily, and most naturally, the terms used imply, as the idea
of the law, that the burning or tearing is to be such as virtually
to destroy the will as an instrument, and not merely enough to
indicate or be consistent with an intent to .abrogate it, and tLe
same remark is applicable to a case of obliteration. Yet in
Avery vs. Pixley, 4 Mass. 460, it was held, that taking off a seal,
placed upon a will as part of the act of executing the same,
although the law did not require such seal, would operate a revocation by tearing, provided it was shown to have been done with
that intent. So in Moore vs. De la Torre, 1 Phillimore 375, the
will and codicil were cut around the margin at the top and one
side, but no part of the writing was touched, except the attestation clause of the codicil was cut through. In this condition
they were found in the room of the testatrix after her decease, in
a box in which she had kept her papers; and on their being propounded for probate, Sir JoRN NIciHOL, after a most elaborate
argument, said: - It is the duty of the court to put a rational
construction upon this act. In my judgment it must have been
done for the purpose of canlcelling, revoking, and destroying the
validity of this instrument. I can put no other rational construction on the act. It must -have been done, not equivocally
but decidedly, for the purpose of revoking the instrument." The
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case, on appeal, was fully and most learnedly argued in the
High Court of Delegates, before seven most able jurists in this
department of the law, and the judgment of the Prerogative
Court was sustained.
In Bibb vs. Thomas, 2 W. Black. 1043, the will was so torn by
the testator as almost to tear a bit off, and then rumpled together
and thrown upon the fire; but it soon fell off and was picked up
by a servant and preserved. By the whole court, DE GRAY, C.
J., , Revocation is an act of the mind, which must be demonstrated by some outward and visible sign or symbol of revocation.
The statute has specified four of these ; and if these or any of
them are performed in the slightest manner, this, joined with the
declared intent, will be a good revocation. It is not necessary
that the will or instrument itself be totally destroyed or consumed,
burnt or torn to pieces. The present case falls within two of the
specified acts described by the statute. It is both a burning and
a tearing. Throwing it on the fire with an intent to burn, though
it is only slightly singed and falls off, is sufficient within the
statute." "In Reed vs. .Harris,83 E. L. & E. 57, the doctrine of
Bibb vs. Thomas is fully asserted; but in the last case it was
held that there must be an actual burning, to some extent, of the
paper of the will. PATTESON, J., said: "There must, at all
events, be a partial burning of the instrument itself: I do not
say that a quantity of words must be burnt; but there must be a
burning of the paper on which the will is." Similar cases, in
which the same doctrine has been held, might be referred to; but
such reference is needless, as there is no substantial conflict of
decision.
Now, as before intimated, the acts of burning and tearing in
the cases cited, are as far from answering to the most natural
import of the words used in the statute, as the act in the present
case is from answering to the primary idea of making lattice-work,
or to the less restricted idea of drawing a cross, or even a single
mark on the face of the writing, in order to constitute cancelling.
On the whole, the true legal idea seems to be well expressed in
2 Am. Lead. Cases 689, as follows: , All that is necessary to a
revocation is an absolute revoking intention, manifested by any
act, however slight in its nature, which can fairly be considered
as a tearing, burning, cancelling, or obliterating, within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds, and the various legislative enact-
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ments which have been based upon it;" and in Williams on
Executors 110, that "the principle appears to have been established, that if the intention to revoke is apparent, an act of
destruction or cancellation should carry such intention into effect,
although not literally an effectual destruction or cancellation, provided the testator had completeil all he designed to do for that
purpose." As to the extent to which such act of revocation must
be done in order to be effectual, perhaps Mr. Justice COLERIDGE
in Reed vs. ffarris, supra, put as proper a general formulary as
is to be found, or as can well be framed; thus, - The question is
put, whether the will must be destroyed wholly, or to what extent?
It is hardly necessary to say, but there must be such an injury,
with intent to revoke, as destroys the entirety of the will; because
it may then be said that the instrument no longer exists as it was."
This language was used with reference to burning or tearing as a
mode of revocation. Applying it to cancelling, "there must be
such a marking, with intent to revoke, that it may be said that
the instrument no longer exists is it was." In the present case,
it would seem pretty palpable, that when the testator had written
where he did, -this will is hereby cancelled and annulled, in full,
this 15th day of March, 1859," the instrument no longer existed
as it was.
Holding this to be sufficiently, in character, an act of cancel1ing, we proceed to remark that the intent is so decisively mhnifested by it, as to give it full effect as an act of revocation. And
we regard our brother PIERPOINT as having most aptly expressed
the true legal idea, when he said in his charge to the jury, that,
- in the writing may be combined both an act and a declaration
of intention."
Upon the face of the will, when produced, it was,
in the eye of the law, cancelled; and the court would have been
warranted in so ruling. This being so, the evidence that was
received of the sayings of the testator, became immaterial, whether made at the time of the act of cancelling, or subsequently
thereto. Hence, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether the
testimony, as to his sayings made subsequently to that act, would
have been admissible as evidence of his intent in doing it, if-it'
had been necessary for the defendant to show, aliunde the instrument, that the act was done. with the intent to revoke the will by
cancelling. Some of the members of the court think the proponent had given occasion for the introduction of this evidence,
by the character of the evidence which she had introduced in the
opening of her case.
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The only remaining question is as to republication, claimed by
the proponent to have been made by sayings of the testator a
few days before his death. The will was revoked by the act of
cancelling. The law of this state recognises as valid, wills made
within this state, only sucl as are made in the mode prescribed
by statute, and it prescribes the only modes in which they may
be revoked. When thus revoked, it would seem quite incongruous that the instrument could be restored to its original vitality
and force by mere words without any further act done upon, or
with reference to, such instrument. We have no wills at, or by
force of the common or ecclesiastical law, but only by statute.
The substance of the 5th section of the Statute of Frauds, 29
Car. II. ch. 3, was enacted as early as 1787 in this state, and in
1821 the full force of that section, as also of the 6th section, was
extended to personal as well as to real estate, and the same has
been substantially the law of this state ever since: Slade's St.
Oh. 44, §§ 17, 18; Gen. St. Oh. 49, §§ 6, 7.
The case before us does not bring in question the effect of executing a codicil with due formalities after the act of revocation,
or of another testamentary instrument referring to and designed
to restore the revoked instrument: nor does it bring in questiofi
other acts done to or upon the instrument itself, subsequently t0
the act of revocation; nor does it involve or call for any discussion of the subject in the light of the cases in other states, in
which the earlier English law as to wills had been adopted and
was in operation to a greater or less extent. See Redf. on Wills,
Ch. VIII., § 29, 1, 2. • We are therefore relieved from the complications and conflicts which the books show to have often troubled other courts; and for the additional reason, that the evidence,
upon which the point as to republication, is predicated, could bear
only upon the question of the testator's intent in doing the act
of revocation. The proponent had the full benefit of that evidence in that view, whether properly or not.
In the discussion and decision of this case, we have given no
consideration to the act or words of the testator, in what he wrote
upon the outside of the folded will under the filing.
The judgment is affirmed.
We have received this case through determined by the court, and the prethe kindness of Mr. Justice BARTETT. cise and perfect manner, so to speak,
The careful and justice-loving spirit in in which the argument in favor of the

which the case has been considered and

decision is presented in the opinion of
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the learned judge, cannot fail to strike earnest effort to come to the same wise
all minds alike with involuntary admi- andjust conclusion, looking only at the
ration. And in such a complication of abstract equity and justice of the case,
buttresses and surrounding outworks, it we cannot but fear that the rule of law
could seem little less than a barbarous here adopted is carrying this already
spirit of faultfinding and love of carp- overstrained department of legal refineing, for any one to interpose a serious ment, somewhat beyond any case which
protest against the principle of law in- has preceded it. We may recur to the
volved in the decision. But. after a -subject hereafter.
I. F. R.
good deal of study and a sincere and

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, at Nisi Prius.
ANSPACH VS. THOMPSON ET AL.
A party applying for an order to examine a party to the record in a bill in
equity, must make it appear that the proposed witness is without interest at the
time the order is asked.
Whether such order is grantable of course on a suggestion of no interest, or
only on previous notice to the opposite party, not decided.
But in either case it must be made with a saving of all just exceptions to the
testimony when presented at the hearing.

Motion for an order to examine defendants on record, as witnesses for a co-defendant.
Porter and Parsons, for plaintiffs.
Cuyler, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
THOmPSON, J.-This is a petition by one of the defendants, J.
Edgar Thompson, on the bill in equity filed by John Anspach
Jr., against him, Alex. Whilldin, Win. J. Howard, and the American Life Insurance Company, for an order to examine before the
master, two of his co-defendants, Alex. Whilldin and Win. J. Howard. He sets forth that the said defendants and himself have severed in their defences, as their answers will show, and that the proposed witnesses have no real interest in the cause or the matters
in question therein ; and that their testimony is material to his
defence, but that he is prevented from taking it before the master, because they are parties of record in the cause.
Undoubtedly an order under such circumstances is necessary
in order to obtain the testimony, let the question of actual inte-
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rest be as it may. That i's to say, when the proposed witnesses
areparties co-defendant, they are not examinable as of course
like other witnesses. Their being on the record prevents this.
Some considerable diversity of opinion at bar seems to exist in
regard to whether the application for the order to examine must
be on previous notice to the opposite party, or whether it is of
course. Daniell's Chancery Practice, vol. 2, p. 459 (Law Library
Ed.) lays down the doctrine thus: "An order for leave to examine a party to the record may be obtained either upon motion in
court or by petition at the rolls. In either case a previbus notice
is unnecessary, as the order will be granted as a matter of course,
tsaving just exceptions,' upon the suggestion that the party to
be examined has no interest in the cause or in the matters in
question in the cause;" citing Murray vs. Shadwell,2 V. & Beames
401. Other authorities cited are to the same effect: Smith's
Chancery 147; Van vs. Corpe, 3 Mylne & Keen 269; Lord
.Dungannon vs. Skinner, 1 Hog. 272 ; Parisvs. rughes, 1 Keen
1; 3 Greenl. Ev. § 318. In New York the practice seems to
have been to proceed by petition: Kirk vs. Hodgson et al., 2 John.
Ch. 550; Whipple et ux. vs. Lansing et al., 8 Id. 612.
Whether the order is of course or not, need not be discussed,
for it is asked on petition here and previous notice, which has
resulted in full argument. Certainly, however, the order is only
grantable where the party proposed to be examined appears to be
without interest at the moment he is called to testify; if before
decree, that he is not subject to one for want of equity or on
account of the proof. In Anon., 18 Yes. Jr. 517, Lord ELDON
refused such an application, observing that "cthe court in making
the order for an examination of a party, saving just exceptions,
proceeds upon the allegation that he has no interest; and if it
perceives an interest will not make the order, even upon the supposition that the interest may be released before the examination;
much less will it make the parties incur the expense of having
the objection of interest taken at the hearing, upon whi6h objection, if it had been taken upon a motion, the court would not
have made such an order."
Mr. Daniell (ubi supra) seems to state the rule somewhat differently. He says: " although the court will, if it perceives that
the suggestion of ' no interest' upon which the order is asked, is
not true in fact, refuse to make the order, the general practice is
to grant the order as a matter of course, leaving it to the other
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party to make the objection that there are 'just exceptions,' at
the time when the deposition is offered to be read." For this see
Lee vs. Atkinson, 2 Cox 413. On this subject see also Adams's
Equity 364, 2d Am. Ed., in notes, citing many English and
American authorities.
I think the rule deducible from the cases is, that the proposed
witnesses must appear to be without interest, whether the order
is based on the allegation simply of "no interest," or upon cause
shown, as in this case. In the investigation of this question, the
interest not appearing in the bill, testimony or answer, I think,
sufficient to exclude, cannot be tested by the counter-affidavit or
answer to the petition or motion. That would be to exclude what
might be disinterested testimony by the interested testimony of
the party himself. At law, where the rule of interest which excludes witnesses is the same as in equity, we-never hear of the
party testifying to the interest of the witness so as to exclude
him. Nor can I look to the affidavit in this case by the party
asserting the interest of these witnesses. It must appear otherwise. Notwithstanding the necessity of appearing to be without
interest, I think the rule general to make the order saving "call
just exceptions" to the testimony when taken, so that the objection may still be made at the hearing. It is impossible, unless
the court be in possession of the whole case, to make a peremptory order to hear the testimony of the parties. It is never
done. Primdfacie then, in this case, no grounds appear for a
decree against the witnesses named, nor that they are otherwise
interested. It seems to me the bill presents no case of liability
against them. Certainly, however this may be, their joint
answer seems a full and complete denial of any present charge
against them, and the complainants' testimony does not seem to
touch, much less overturn the answers. I say this is as the case
presents itself to me at this stage. I shall grant the order to
saving alljust exceptions"
examine Messrs. Whilldin and Howard ",
to their testimony, which I understand may be taken to their
competency, or for any other legal reason, at the hearing before
the master. And I shall direct that the master return with his
report the testimony thus taken, together with the entire testimony in the case.
Let an order be drawn in accordance herewith.

N. S. TELEGRAPH CO. vs. AMERICAN TELEGRAPH CO.

365

Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.
THE NOVA SCOTIA TELEGRAPH CO. VS. THE AMERICAN TELEGRAPH C0.

1

By the terms of a lease of property situate within the British dominions, it
was provided that certain payments should be made periodically in "dollars and
cents of United States currency." After the execution of the lease the Congress
of the United States passed a law authorizing an issue of treasury notes not
bearing interest, and provided, that they "shall be lawful money and a legal
tender in payment of all debts public and private, within the United Statesexcept in payment of duties on imports and interest on United States bonds or
notes:"
Held, that the tender of United States treasury notes, issued under this act,
was not a legal and sufficient tender of the payments due under the lease.

This was an action to recover the sum of $6500 and interest,
under a lease executed by the plaintiffs on the 4th May, 1860, to
the defendants, whereby the plaintiffs granted and leased to the
defendants all the telegraph lines, with the appurtenances belonging to them in and throughout the Province of Nova Scotia, for
the term of ten years, commencing from the 15th May, 1860,
subject to the payment of the rent of $6000 per annum, payable
semi-annually; and the further sum of $500 per annum, also payable semi-annually towards the taxes of that company, it being
stipulated and agreed, that all such payments should be made
" in dollars and cents of United States currency." In the month
of November, 1862, and again in the month of May, 1863, the
agent of the defendants tendered to the treasurer of the plaintiffs in Halifax certain United States treasury notes, issued
under an Act of Congress of February, 1862, entitled: " An
act to authorize an additional issue of United States notes and
for other purposes," to the amount of $8250, in full payment of
each of the semi-annual payments which had respectively become
due under the lease. The treasurer objected to the tender and
refused to receive the notes when so tendered, requiring such
payments to be made in specie, which not having been done, the
present action was brought.
Joh~nstone, Attorney-General, and Smith, Q. C., for plaintiffs.
lfeoully, Solicitor-General, and Ritchie, Q. C., for defendants.
1 We are indebted for this case to the kindness of Mr. Justice INGRAHAM, of the
Supreme Court of New York.
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DES BARRES, J., after stating the facts proceeded :-The
question submitted for the judgment of the court is, whether the
tender of United States treasury notes, issued under the Act of
Congress referred to, is a legal and sufficient tender of the semiannual payments due in November, 1862, and May, 1863, under
the lease. By the Act of Congress of February, 1862, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue on the credit of the
United States $150,000,000 of United States notes not bearing
interest, payable to bearer at the Treasury of the United States,
of such denominations as he may deem expedient, not less than
$5 each, provided that such notes shall be receivable in payment
of taxes, internal duties, debts, and demands of every kind due
to the United States, except duties on imports, and of all claims
and demands against the United States of every kind whatsoever,
except for interest upon bonds and notes, which shall be paid in
coin, c and shall also be lawful money, and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States,
except duties on imports and interest as aforesaid."
It was contended at the argument, that the defendants by the
terms of the lease were bound to pay the rent reserved therein in
specie, viz., in dollars and cents, the current coin of the United
States, and that the tender made by the defendants in treasury
notes was not, therefore, a fulfilment of the contract; first,
because the contract or lease entered into between the parties,
was made in Nova Scotia; secondly, because the rent reserved,
and the allowance of $500 a year for taxes, are payable in Nova
Scotia; and, thirdly, because the property demised is within the
province of Nova Scotia. It was also insisted that assuming the
rent to be payable in the currency of the United States as contended for on the part of the defendants, the plaintiffs were not
bound to receive the notes tendered in payment, because Congress
had no power under the Constitution of the United States to
make such notes a legal tender for private debts, and if it had, the
Act of Congress declaring them a legal tender could not be construed as having a retrospective effect. The two last objections
are substantially the same as were raised in the case of Meyer vs.
Roosevelt, which was decided in the Supreme Court for the state
of New York in March Term, 1863, and cited at the argument
by the Attorney-General. In that case the plaintiff desiring to
pay a mortgage held by defendant, in premises purchased and
conveyed to the plaintiff subject to the mortgage, tendered to the
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defendant the amount due on the mortgage in United States notes,
such as were tendered here. The defe'dant refused to receive
them as a legal tender, claiming payment in specie. The question
as to the legality of the tender was submitted to the learned
judges of that court, who unanimously expressed the opinion
that the framers of the Constitution intended to make coin and
nothing else a legal tender in payment of debts, and while they
conceded that Congress had power to issue paper money to meet
the exigencies of the Government, they held that it had no
power to pass an act declaring such money a legal tender in payment of private debts, such at least as were created before the
passage of that act. If the ruling in that case had not been
questioned, the present case, I presume, would never have been
presented to us for consideration, but on being brought up before
the learned judges of the Court of Appeals for the same state, the
decision in Meyer vs. Roosevelt (of which I cannot say I disapprove) was reversed, and treasury notes were by that court held
and declared to be a legal tender for payment of all debts con-,
tracted there. I do not know whether the decision of the appellate court has been acquiesced in or not. If approved, and there
is no intention of demanding a review of it by the Supreme
Court of the United States, the important question involved must
be considered as judicially settled in that country; but it does
not follow that this decision is to be considered as binding or
affecting any contracts made here. It is not my intention to
express any opihion as to the constitutional right of Congress to
declare these treasury notes a legal tender within the United
States, nor is it necessary, in the view I take of this case, to
decide whether that act has' or not a retrospective operation.
The consideration of these points would open up a large field for
inquiry, not connected with this case, which I think more appropriately belongs to and may more fitly be left as it has been, for
the investigation and decision of the Federal courts: but looking
at these questions, in all their bearings, without intending to do
more than merely to state my present impressions with regard to
, them, I may say, with all deference to the learned judges of the
appellate court, that I have not been able to remove the impression resting in my mind, that the conclusion arrived at by the
Supreme Court in Meyer vs. Roosevelt is a sound conclusion.
Assuming, however, that Congress had the power it has exercised
of making these treasury notes a legal tender within the United
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States, and that the act was intended to apply to past as well as
future transactions, the question here is whether the plaintiffs,
according to the terms of the lease granted to the defendants, are
bound to receive these treasury notes in payment of the rent due
them-in other words, whether the tender made in these treasury
notes for rent payable in Nova Scotia is a legal tender, and can
be considered as a fulfilment of the terms of that lease. The
parties had a right to make the rent payable in coin or bills, or
in any other thing they pleased. They have thought fit to make
it payable " in dollars and cents of United.States currency," and
there being now metallic money and treasury notes called paper
money in circulation in the United States, we are called upon to
decide whether it is optional with the defendants under this lease
to pay the rent in either, or, whether the plaintiffs have a right
to demand and insist that payment shall be made in metallic
money, that is in gold and silver current in the United States.
If the words of the stipulation are construed to mean coin, or
any notes or bills of credit to be issued under the authority of
Congress, as a substitute for coin, giving to the defendants the
alternative, it follows, that the tender must be held sufficient, but
if the words were meant to be regarded as descriptive of the
denomination or kind of money in which the payments were to be
made, the tender cannot be held good.
It may reasonably be supposed, that the stipulation for payment was made in reference to the then existing state of the currency of the United States, and of the value of that currency
here. At that time these treasury notes had no existence, and
the possibility of such notes being substituted for coin, and made
a legal tender for private debts within the United States, and of
their being offered here as such, could not have been contemplated
by either of the parties. If, indeed, such notes had been in circulation, and the plaintiffs had agreed to receive the rent in dotlars and cents of United States currency, without discriminating
whether they were to be metallic dollars or paper dollars, the
case would have presented a different aspect, and probably have
necessitated an inquiry, not now essential to the decision of this
case. It was conceded at the argument, that before the passage
of the Act of 'Congress of February, 1862, there was no lawful
money of the United States other than gold and silver coin, that
could be used as a legal tender, and it is not pretended that any
other could have been so used. That fact, of which both parties
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must have been aware, I think explains the meaning of the stipulation, and shows that the understandiag between theni was, that
the rent should be paid in coin, designated and known as metallic
dollars and cents of United States currency, or in money of equal
value. I do not see that any other interpretation can reasonably
be given to the stipulation, for if that which is insisted upon on
the part of the defendants be the true and proper interpretation,
it will produce this result, that the plaintiffs will be compelled to
receive in payment depreciated paper called money, which is not
current in this province as money, and not uniformly current in the
United States, it not being receivable there in payment of duties
on imports, nor for interest on bonds, &c., due by the Government
of the country. Surely nothing so unjust as this could ever have
been intended, nor can I imagine it was for a moment contemplated, that while receiving and putting into their own pockets
the money of extrinsic value, which the property demised produces in Nova Scotia, the defendants were to.be at liberty to pay
the rent as well as the taxes in depreciated paper money of the
United States. I do not mean, however, to say, that the defendants are bound to pay the plaintiffs metallic money, simply because
the property demised produces such money here; on the contrary,
I readily admit that, if the plaintiffs by the terms of the lease
have unwisely agreed to receive payment in any description of
money that may be made or declared to be current in the United
States, be it metallic or paper money, the tender of the latter
must in that case be a fulfilment of the contract ; but it must be
borne in mind, that the rent is not expressed to be paid in United
States currency, whatever that may be, it is expressly stipulated
to be paid -in dollars and cents of United States currency," a
stipulation, which I take it points to and means that particular
denomination of m6ney known as metallic dollars and cents of
United States currency. In common parlance, dollars and cents
mean metallic dollars and cents stamped under the authority of
Government, and current at the mint value. Such are properly
called money. It is true bank notes and bills of credit issued by
authority and exchangeable for and redeemable in coin, are also
called money, as such notes are used as a substitute for coin; but
they are not a substitute, unless'they are redeemable in coin.
The treasury notes issued under the Act of Congress of 1862
are not, and do not upon the face of them profess to be, redeemable in specie, nor are they considered, as I have already said, in
VOL. MIII.-24
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all cases as a substitute for specie in the United States. In this
respect tley differ very essentially from Bank of England notes,
which, by stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 98, are made a legal tender "cto
the amount expressed in such notes, and shall be taken to be
valid as a tender to such amount for all sums above five pounds,
on all occasions in which any tender of money may be legally
made, so long as the Bank of England shall continue to pay their
notes on demand, in legal coin." This act shows the wisdom and
sound policy of the British Parliament, in providing that Bank
of England notes shall be a legal tender only so long as the bank
shall continne to pay them on demand, in legal coin. These notes
may well be called money, for money can be obtained for them
at any time; but no money can be obtained at the Treasury for
treasury notes issued under the Act of Congress February, 1862,
for they are not redeemable in money, and yet they are by that
act declared to be a legal tender for all debts, except for duties
on imports, &c., which must be paid in coin.
In considering this case, I have regarded these treasury notes
as money current in the United States for all the purposes
declared in the act, but I have arrived at the conclusion that this
is not the description of money which the plaintiffs have a right
to demand, and the defendants are bound to pay according to the
-terms of the lease. In my opinion the defendants are bound to
-pay the rent in metallic dollars and cents of United States curTency, or in other money being of the value of such metallic dol"lars and cents, and, therefore, I am of opinion that the tender
made to the plaintiffs in treasury notes of the United States was
not a sufficient tender, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to have
judgment for such amount as may be found to be due, calculated
according to the value of the money in which I think the rent and
taxes ought to be paid.
WILKINS,

J.-The facts on which we are required to adjudi-

cate are set forth in the special case entered into by the parties.
When this contract was made, "c dollars" was a legalized denomination of the currency of Nova Scotia, and accordingly the rent
is reserved payable in dollars. In a subsequent part of the lease,
however, which defines the medium of payment, different language
is used. The phraseology adopted in this last respect is, " Such
payment shall be made in dollars and cents of the United States
currency."
It was contended by the plaintiffs' counsel, that the
effect of this was to give the plaintiffs a right to demand from the
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defendants metallic dollars and cents. That argument, however,
cannot be sustained. We must construe the language, dollars
and cents, occurring in the passage of the lease in question in
its relation to United States currency, as we should have to construe it in regard to Nova Scotia currency, if the qualifying words
had not been adopted. Let us inquire, then, what would be the
necessary judicial construction of this instrument if the qualifying language had been omitted, and the contract were, as in that
case it would be, a strictly internal or domestic one.
In interpreting such a contract we should unquestionably hold
that the phrase dollars and cents did not, either in a strict sense
or in a familiar one, import coined money or metallic dollars and
cents. The immediate and instinctive understanding of it, as
interpreted by men of every degree of intelligence in every day's
transactions of buying or selling, lending and borrowing, would
be that its meaning was identical with that which the words lawful currency of the Province of Nova Scotia would have conveyed
had they been substituted.
The president of a banking company established in this city,
the most enlightened merchant, or the pettiest trader doing business in it, would alike interpret the language of a contract made
in Halifax on the fifth day of January, 1864, whereby his debtor
stipulated to pay him a hundred dollars on demand, as giving
him no right to demand one hundred dollars of that particular
metallic coin which is denominated a dollar, but he would acknowledge that the stipulation was performed by payment of twentyfive British sovereigns, or by a payment in paper money, if our
legislature had made it a legal tender for payment of all debts.
His business instincts would at once suggest to him that " dollars
and cents" was synonymous with "legal currency." He would
not, in the case put, feel himself obliged to accept paper money,
because he knows that there is none such in circulation in this
province which is made a legal tender for all purposes, and
which would, therefore, constitute a medium of compulsory payment of the particular debt.
Thus, then, as dollars and cents is, and at the time of the
making of this contract, and when the sums became due, was in
the United States as in Nova Scotia, the legalized denomination
of moneys of account or of the currency of either country, and
as our inquiry is by the special case directed to a state of things
existing in the United States of America in November, 1862,
and May, 1863, that inquiry is reduced to the mere question,
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"Were these particular notes of the United States Treasury, in
which the tenders by the defendants were made, at the times when
such were made, the legal currency or a constituent part of the
legal currency of the United States of America in the sense of
the contracting parties ?" To interpret this contract according to
their intentions we must adopt the well-known rule and regard
the surrounding circumstances at the time when the contract was
entered into.
The then legal currency of the United States was coined dollars and cents, or their equivalent in other, coins, recognised and
legalized by Congress, and at that time paper .money was not in
any form a portion of that legal currency-it was not then a legal
tender within the Union. Such coined money was then the only
legal tender throughout the United States in payment of all
debts or duties, public or private, without any qualification or
limitation whatsoever.
The immediate subject of contemplation, therefore, at the time
of making this contract, in the minds of the contractors, must
have been an agreed medium of payment of the accruing rents
which, as an instrument of exchange and commerce in any and
every relation of business in the United States of America, would
be as available in that country for every trading purpose, at the
times appointed for the payment of the rents, &c., as dollars and
cents of the United States currency, the existing legal currency
at the time of the contract, at that time practically was for every

commercial purpose within and throughout the Union.
The parties, moreover, must be reasonably taken to have contemplated a medium of payment which would be so available in
every Nova Scotian hand into which it might pass, for purposes
of business or money exchanges, in any relation of commerce in
the United States, after payment therein should be actually made
in Halifax as stipulated.
In my judgment the medium so contemplated would have been,
in legal effect, subject to any changes, for better or for worse,
which might after the contract be operated on it by the authorized constitutional legislation of Congress, and assuming such
legislation, I have no doubt that if the treasury notes tendered had been made in an unlimited sense ,legal currency"
throughout the Union, they would .have been made, for the purposes of this contract, dollars and cents of the United States
currency.
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At the same time, I think that it cannot be reasonably held to
have been contemplated by the parties, that the lessors bound
themselves to receive, in satisfaction for the accruing rents, any
medium of payment that would be only in a qualified and not in
an absolute sense a portion of the lawful currency of the United
States at the time appointed for payment. Now the greenback
issue unquestionably was not, in an unlimited and unqualified
sense, such currency. This view may be thus illustrated by
reference to the actual relations of one of these contracting parties-the lessors-to the appointed medium of payment, at the date
of the lease. Adverting to the nature of the legal currency of
the United States at that time, it is clear that a Nova Scotian
receiving it in Halifax, in payment of a debt due to him by a
New York merchant, could in the exercise of commercial transactions with that city, which are in fact of 'frequent occurrence,
pay his duties on his import of goods into the United States, in
that which was, at the time of the making of this contract, dollars
and cents of the United States currency.
He would have received at Halifax the metallic coins then legalized, or something which gave him a right to receive them in the
United States, and with what he received he could pay such duties at the custom-house in the city of New York. And surely,
it was dollars and cents of United States currency that formed,
and would form practically, a medium of commerce as unqualified and unlimited as that which 1 have described, which was
really in contemplation of both these contractingparties when this
lease was executed.
If, however, we subject to this test the question submitted,
what do we find as a necessary consequence of upholding the contention of these defendants, viz.: that they made a legal tender
in the treasury notes in question ?" We find, as the effect of an express provision in the Act of Congress, that in November, 1862, and
May, 1863, the times of payment, these plaintiffs could not, neither
could those to whom they might have transferred these notes (had
the plaintiffs accepted them), have made them so available for all
the purposes to which the metallic coins or their equivalents could
have been made subservient at the time of this contract, and that
consequence results from a legislation of Congress so special that
it affects some and not all even of the citizens of the Union.
The merchant, for instance, who has to find gold for payment
of duties on importation of goods at the custom-house, is placed
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on a different footing from that on which the merchant's customer
stands, who can pay a debt that he owes to the merchant with
the greenback currency. These views would, I think, derive support from the following consideration, though in reality it is
involved in them.
This Act of Congress has not superseded or annullbd the previously-existing metallic currency by the' substitution of a currency of a different nature; but it has merely superadded a
paper currency which it has made in common with the precious
metals a legal tender, sub 7nodo for the payment of debts within
the Union. This, too, has been done avowedly as matter of special and anomalous legislation, to meet the exigencies of a crisis
in the affairs of a great nation, which its statesmen and legislators did not foresee nor anticipate at the time when this particular lease was executed, and which, therefore, we cannot suppose
to have been contemplated as a future contingency by the parties
to that instrument. They, as I have already said, must be taken,
nevertheless, to have contemplated the possible contingency
(which fortunately for these plaintiffs has not happened) of there
being, at the times named for payment, a different currency,
legally substitutedfor that which was the legal currency when the
contract was entered into. In the respect that there has been in
this case instituted by Congress a mere subsidiary, and not a substituted currency, the case is not governed by a class of wellknown authorities that would otherwise have affected and regulated the question under consideration. Those to which I more
particularly refer are Faw vs. Marstellar,2 Cranch 20 ; -Denmon
vs. Executors of Denmon, 1 Wash. Virg. Rep. 26; Pong vs.
Lindsay et al., Dyer 82, A. ; and a case reported in Davies,
p. 28.
In the judicial construction of contracts in the courts of the
Union, these distinctions would of course have no weight, because
in that country an express provision of this Act of Congress precludes the creditor-a siject of the law-from demanding payment of the debt due him in a metallic currency. "What is a
legal tender to him for a debt due him in the United States ?" is,
however, one question. "What is such in our courts, and in
reference to a contract made here, and to be performed here, by
payment in dollars and cents of United States currency ?" is, 1
apprehend, another and a different question. I have considered
it judicially according to the best of my abilities. In doing so,
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it affords me much pleasure to reflect that I am not called on to
express an opinion on the difficult and delicate point of the constitutionality of the Act of Congress, respecting which a grave
question has been raised in courts of the United States, whose
enlightened decisions we have learned to respect.
The conclusion at which I have arrived is, that the notes tendered by these defendants were not - dollars and cents of United
States currency" in the sense in which that phrase is used in the
lease before us: in other words, that they were not, at the time
of the tender, "the legal currency of the United States of America," for the purpose of forming a medium of performance of
the covenant to pay the rents, &c., reserved in the document set
forth in the special case submitted.
DODD, J., after stating the facts of the case, proceeded:It may be and no doubt is difficult to find a case precisely in
point with the present, and when that occurs, we must look to
general principles, which must govern us in this instance as in all
others. One of those principles is, that the law of the place
where the contract is made, and where the money is to be paid,
when these places are one and the same, shall prevail, unless
words are used in the contract that would lead to a different conclusion.
The defendants have established themselves in this province,
their business extending to every part of it, and while they contend that the plaintiffs are bound to receive their rents in a spurious currency, they may claim to shelter themselves under our
Provincial Currency Act, and receive no debts in any moneys unless
made a legal tender by that act; and in addition to this advantage,
which they would possess over the plaintiffs by giving to the contract that unequal construction, the plaintiffs would be placed in
this unreasonable position, that after receiving the amount due to
them in the paper currency, they could only use it for limited
purposes in the United States, and not for purposes that they
might expressly require it for. I cannot suppose that either party,
when the contract was entered into, looked to such a result as that,
but that their arrangements and calculations were founded in good
faith, and their contract based upon the currency of the United
States that was then in existence in that country-that currency
being a metallic one.
If I am correct in this view of the case, then the plaintiffs
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come before the court with large equities in their favor, and
unless restrained by some known principles of law, would be entitled to a judgment in their favor. The contract having been
made in this province respecting property within it, and the rents
accruing under it, to be paid into one of the banks of the province, makes it purely, as between the parties to it, a provincial
contract, and in my opinion gives it a different position, and
requires a different construction from a contract made in the province, and a debt becoming due under it and payable in the
United States. In that case there might be some show of reason
for bringing it within the purview of the Act of Congress. The
act can have no legal or binding effect upon debts in this country,
and how far the Congress may have the power to make such an
enactment I am not prepared to say. That question has been
argued in the Supreme Court in two districts of the state of New
York,-in one the decision of the court was against that power,
and in the other it was different,-and in both cases I understand
an appeal was taken to the highest appellate jurisdiction of the
United States, but, up to the present time I have not heard the
result; neither is it my intention to decide this case upon the
point; that the Act of Congress was not intended to be ex post
facto in its operation, although taken at the argument by the
Attorney-General, and I cannot help thinking, that a large amount
of solid reasoning might be urged in support of it. The paper
issue of the United States under the Act of Congress, may be
admitted, would liquidate a debt contracted and payable in that
country; but there is a marked distinction to a debt contracted in
this province and payable here, notwithstanding the payment is
to be made in dollars and cents of the currency of the United
States. The parties to this suit, we must remember, are the
-Nova Scotia Telegraph Co.," incorporated by an act of the
Province, and the defendants a foreign company incprporated
under a charter granted by the state of New Jersey. Now the
rents to be paid the plaintiffs could only be legally tendered to
them in the coins made a legal tender by the Provincial Currency Act, chapter 83 of the Revised Statutes, unless otherwise
provided by the contract, and by that act, although several
foreign coins are made a legal tender, yet the coins of the United
States are not so, consequently the contract giving to the defendants the advantage of paying their rents and liabilities in dollars
and cents of their own country was extending to them an import-
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ant advantage, but not in my opinion to be enlarged beyond
making their payments in the currency that existed in the United
States when the contract was made. If, since the contract was
entered into, circumstances have occurred in the United States to
justify that country issuing a paper currency and making it a
legal tender for debts due and payable there, surely it would be
great injustice to the people of this provice to allow the citizens
of the United States, under a contract entered into here, where no
circumstances exist to change the commercial or political relations of the province since the contract was made, to pay their
debts due and payable here in a paper currency of little more
than half its value as expressed upon its face.
The Act of Congress declares the notes to be a legal tender in
payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States,
except duties on imports and interest, &c. ; but it cannot be said
that the debt claimed by the plaintiffs is a debt due and payable
either as a public or private debt within the United States, and
to no other class of debts than those referred to in the act can
it be applicable. A debt due and payable in Nova Scotia, in
law, can only be liquidated by the moneys mentioned in the Currency Act of the Province. Dollars and cents of the United
States currency, if not referable solely to the dollar and cen,
current in that country when the contract was made, must refer
to a dollar and cent current for all purposes ; but, as I have said,
the paper issue under the Act of Congress is not for all purposes
but limited in its operation, and if the plaintiffs were now held to
the tender made by the defendants, and had moneys to pay in
the lTnited States for either of the excepted purposes of the act,
the moneys received from the defendants would not be available
for that purpose; that consequence then cannot, in my opinion,
be a just and reasonable solution of the contract.
If I had any doubt respecting this case, as to the justice of
my views with reference to the defendants being liable to the
plaintiffs in the current money of the United States when the
contract was entered into, or what is equivalent to that currency,
the case of Pilkington vs. Commissioners for Olaims, 2 Knapp
R. 17 to 21, would remove the doubt. That case is fully referred
to in Story on the Conflict of Laws, sec. 313 a, and from that work
I now quote: c The French Government, during the war between
England and France, had confiscated a debt due from a French
subject to a British subject, and subsequently an indemnity was
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stipulated for on the part of the French Government; and there
having been a great depreciation of the French currency after
the time when the debt was confiscated, the question arose whether the debt was to be calculated at the value of the currency
at the time when the confiscation took place or subsequently, and
it was held it ought to be calculated according to the value at the
time of the confiscation. Sir WILLIAm GRANT, in delivering the
opinion of the -ourt, said, , great part of the argument at the bar
would undoubtedly go to show that the commissioners have acted
wrong in throwing that loss upon the French Government in any
case, for they resemble it to the case of depreciation of currency
happening between the time that a debt is contracted and the
time it is paid, and they have quoted authorities for the purpose
of showing that in such a case the loss must be borne by the
creditors and not by the debtor. That point, it is unnecessary
for the present purposes to consider, though Vinnius, whose
authority was quoted the other day, certainly comes to a conclusion directly at variance with the decision in Sir John Davies's
Reports' " (an authority strongly relied upon by the counsel
for the defendants in the present case). Sir William, in a subsequent part of -his opinion, again reverts to the same subject, and
remarks: - We have said that as this point is not directly or immediately before us, it can make no part of our decree. At the
same time it may not perhaps have been without some utility to
have given an opinion upon it, inasmuch as it was argued and
discussed at the bar; and we think, therefore, the commissioners
have proceeded upon a perfectly right principle in those cases in
which we understood they have made an allowance for the depreciation of paper money."
Here, then, we have the opinion of
the court delivered by that profound lawyer Sir WILLIAM GRANT,
that in a case between when the debt was contracted and payable, and when it was paid, a depreciation in the currency of the
country had taken place, the creditor was not to be the sufferer,
but that he was to have an allowance made to him by the debtor
to the extent of such depreciation.
It is admitted in this case,
that the paper money tendered to the plaintiffs is depreciated
since its issue in the United States, and is of much less value
than the dollar which was the currency of that country when the
contract was made. Apart then from other considerations under
the opinion of the court as delivered by Sir WILLIAm GRANT, the
defendants would not discharge their liability to the plaintiffs by

